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There is now a considerable body of theoretical and empirical research concerned with 
offender decision-making (see Bernasco, Van Geder and Elffers, 2017). Research has 
focused on a variety of offender decisions – whether to commit crime or not, where, 
when, how – as well as documenting those factors reliably found to affect criminal 
choices. The rational choice perspective has emerged as the dominant model of 
offender decision-making (Cornish and Clarke, 2008). It holds that crime is a choice, 
and that individuals are more likely to commit crime if the anticipated rewards exceed 
the perceived risks and effort.  
 
The first incarnation of the rational choice perspective deemphasized the role (and 
source) of offender motivation. It assumed a state of readiness on the part of the 
offender and focused instead on situational contingencies that might make a motivated 
offender more or less likely to engage in crime. Later elaborations paid greater attention 
to the relationship between motivation and the immediate environment, most notably 
the work of Wortley (2008) on situational precipitators – emotional (situational) 
triggers that serve to initiate or intensify motivation to commit crime that otherwise 
would not have been considered absent such situational factors. More recent research,  
informed by developments across the behavioural sciences, has investigated the role of 
emotion in offender decision-making, asking how emotion affects interpretations of 
risk, effort and reward, and what this means for the practical task of formulating 
measures designed to influence the choices of prospective offenders (for e.g. see van 
Gelder, Elffers, Reynald and Nagin, 2013).   
 
The purpose of this paper is to review what previous research has found on the role of 
fear and other associated feelings in the criminal decision making process, and the 
techniques that might plausibly amplify such emotions so as to reduce or disrupt intent. 
To this aim, we conduct a systematic review of the offender decision-making literature, 
incorporating a qualitative synthesis of the role of fear in the criminal decision- making 
process. Where appropriate we supplement our synthesis with evidence from cognate 
research areas.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the motivation for 
and methods used in our systematic review of the offender decision making literature. 
The results then follow, discussing in turn evidence on the existence of fear in offender 
decision-making, the presumed source, variation in levels of self-reported fear and/or 
its effect across offenders, the specific role of fear across different aspects of the crime 
commission process (before, during, after), and offender fear management processes. 
We conclude by discussing how this evidence may inform efforts to disrupt crime by 
denying key information (thus increasing the effort), detecting suspicious behaviour 
(thus increasing the risk) and deterring would-be criminal activities (by minimizing the 
reward) (Ekblom & Hirschfield, 2014).   
 
Systematic review of the offender decision-making literature 
 
Systematic reviews are widely practiced throughout the social and medical sciences 
(see Gough, Oliver and Thomas, 2012). They are generally considered to be a 
trustworthy source of research evidence, in part because of their adherence to an 
explicit, transparent and reproducible search strategy that includes both the published 
and unpublished literature, thereby mitigating the familiar problem of publication bias. 
Systematic reviews, like primary studies, can take various forms. In criminology, most 
systematic reviews involve a meta-analysis and are concerned with questions of 
effectiveness: does the available evidence indicate that a particular intervention is 
effective at reducing crime? This is typically answered by aggregating the available 
data (from a sample of studies) to produce a combined estimate of effect. 
 
This paper is not a conventional systematic review. It is not concerned with determining 
the effectiveness of a given intervention. Instead, it is a configurative synthesis (see 
Gough, Oliver and Thomas, 2012) in which the chief aim is to appraise the relevant 
literature so as to identify recurrent themes and concepts. In our case, as is described 
below, this involved scrutinizing a wide range of studies with a view to exploring the 
presence and relevance of fear and associated negative emotions and their impact on 
criminal decision-making.  
 
The following sections detail the methods used in our review, including the inclusion 
criteria, strategy for identifying studies, search terms and data extraction and 
management processes.  
 
Criteria for considering studies for inclusion 
 
We used the following inclusion criteria: 
 
a) The study must have reported an explicit goal of seeking to chart and/or 
understand criminal decision-making. Crime, for the purposes of the review, 
was limited to those acts that involve a certain degree of planning and 
preparation. Those crimes that are assumed to be largely spontaneous were 
excluded.1 
 
Studies also had to report information on at least one of the items below: 
 
b) The environmental conditions that might affect criminal decisions in the context 
of risk and security; 
c) Factors associated with the individual decision maker that might affect criminal 
decisions in the context of risk and security. 
 
Finally, the study had to report: 
d) some aspect related to emotions in the decision-making process.  
 
We did not discriminate on research design.  
 
Identifying studies: databases and information sources  
 
Studies were identified using the following search methods: 
 
                                                 
1 This was a decision of convenience and we recognise that even so-called spontaneous crimes 
can be thought to have rational elements consistent with the rational choice perspective.  
1) A keyword search of four electronic databases including grey literature and 
dissertation databases2 up to July 2016 (when this study commenced) 
2) Forward and backward citation searches of all eligible studies until April 2017 
(when the searching phase of this study concluded).  
 
Full text versions of identified studies were obtained through one of the following 
means: electronic copies via the university’s e-journals service, electronic copies of 
studies available from elsewhere on the internet, paper copies, electronic/paper copies 
requested through the inter-library loan system, which sources most materials from the 
British Library and electronic/paper copies requested from the authors themselves. 
Should any of the full text versions of the works collated contain insufficient 
information to determine their eligibility for inclusion according to our coding strategy 
(described below), where possible the corresponding author was contacted in an attempt 
to retrieve this information.  
 
More generally, the review considered published and unpublished (grey) studies. No 
retrospective date restrictions were applied. Studies however had to be available in 
English since available resources limited our ability to search and translate non-English 
studies. 
 
Search terms  
Table 1 lists the search terms used in this review. These include terms relevant to 
criminals, decision-making and risk: 
 




Offender* “rational choice” Deterrence 
“law*breaker*” “offence process” “perceived risk” 
Burglars “commission of 
crime” 
  
Robbers Distance   
Thieves Journey   
Thief Distance   
Stalker* “location choice”   
                                                 
2 PsycINFO, International Bibliography of Social Sciences, Sociological Abstracts and the National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service 
Rapist* Reconnaissance   
Shoplifter* “cost-benefit”   
“offender 
perspective” 
“economic model”   
Anti*social* “crime script*”   
Delinquen* “target selection”   
Violen* Mobility   
Murderer* Rationality   
Killer*     
  
 
Data extraction and management f 
 
The first level of screening involved the review team examining the title and abstract 
of those studies returned following our electronic and bibliographic searches. All 
references were first uploaded to the EPPI 4 reviewer software, a web-based program 
developed by the Social Science Research Unit at the Institute of Education, UCL, to 
manage and analyse data generated from systematic reviews.3 Once uploaded, studies 
failing to meet inclusion criteria were excluded (with rates of attrition noted – see 
Figure 1). Excluded studies were flagged as inappropriate in one of several ways. First, 
many studies were not crime or offender related. Second, many studies were solely 
focused upon criminal justice and policing topics and tools (e.g. risk assessment). Third, 
many offender-oriented studies were not focused upon individual decision-making. 
Fourth, although focused upon criminal decision-making, many studies were omitted 
because they were hypothetical or theoretical rather than empirical. Fifth, a few studies 
were omitted on the basis of being entirely spontaneous crimes. Sixth, book reviews 
and other similar documents were omitted.  
 
Those studies deemed eligible based on title and abstract were then read in their entirety 
to determine eligibility. Studies were excluded at this stage for either not being a 
primary study or not centered on offender decision-making. As depicted in Figure 1, 46 
studies were eligible for synthesis from this screening. Backwards and forwards citation 
searches were performed on each of these 46 studies to pursue further candidate studies. 
This involved reviewing the titles of each study cited within the initially included study 
and also the subsequent citations that each eligible study accrued. Each title was then 
                                                 
3 See: http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Default.aspx?alias=eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms up /er4 
judged against the above inclusion criteria. For each eligible study found in the 
backwards and forwards searches, additional backwards and forwards searches were 
conducted until all leads were exhausted. An additional 47 eligible studies were found 
through these methods (see Figure 1). 
 





The next stage involved extracting data from the 93 included studies. Entering the 
information into an Excel spreadsheet, reviewers recorded the following information 
(if applicable): 
 
1. Study details (title, year, author(s), publication status, study location(s)) 
2. Crime type(s) 
3. Research design (qualitative interviews, process tracing techniques etc.) 
4. Description of comparison group, place or period, where applicable 
5. Sample (size and any notable features) 
6. Statistical test(s) used, where applicable  
7. Outcome measure reported and data source  
8. Effect sizes (where applicable and/or reported) were initially coded as reported 
(but see below)  
9. Mention of possible mechanisms that impacted decision-making 
10. Conclusions of the author(s) 
 
Owing to the nature of the studies identified (many were qualitative) and heterogeneity 
of the reported results, meta-analysis was deemed inappropriate4.  
 
For the purposes of the configurative synthesis reported in this paper, a further 
screening criterion was applied to the 93 included studies after the initial data had been 
extracted. This specified that a study had to mention some aspect related to emotions 
negatively impacting upon the offenders’ beliefs, attitudes or intentions. 23 studies 
were found to meet this criterion. 
 
The lead author read and wrote summaries for each of the 23 identified studies. These 
were then discussed with three research assistants in order to reach a consensus around 




The results section is formed of six parts based on dominant themes identified in our 
eligible studies, namely: evidence of fear in offender decision-making, the presumed 
sources of fear, variation in levels and/or the effect of fear across offenders, the specific 
role of fear across aspects of the crime process (before, during, after), the results of fear 
and offender fear management processes.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Meta-analysis is undertaken when there is comparable quantitative data available, which was 
not the case in the sample of studies synthesised here. 
Evidence of Fear 
 
Numerous studies point to self-reported feelings of fear, nerves, stress, tension, worries, 
apprehension, anxiety, physical sickness and uncertainty expressed by street robbers 
(Alarid et al., 2009), first time sex offenders (Beauregard & Bouchard, 2010), 
shoplifters (Cardone & Hayes, 2012; Carmel-Gilfilen. 2013), thieves (Hochstetler, 
2002), auto-thieves (Copes & Tewksbury, 2011; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2016; Jacobs 
& Cherbonneau, 2017; Cherbonneau & Copes, 2006), burglars (Bennett & Wright, 
1984; Cromwell, Olson, Avary & Marks, 1991b; Hockey, 2016), card fraudsters (Finch, 
2011), armed robbers (Kapardis, 1988; Kroese & Staring, 1994; Gill, 2000) and 
unarmed robbers (Feeney, 1986; Hochstetler, 2001; Kang & Lee, 2013; Walsh, 1986; 
Wiersma, 1996; Wright & Decker, 1994).  
  
Copes and Tewksbury (2011) investigated what offenders fear during auto theft. Whilst 
interviewing 42 offenders, “the most consistent theme throughout…was the common 
experience of extreme physical sensations, often described as a ‘rush’ or ‘butterflies’, 
that occur during the offending activity. Such experiences can be interpreted as 
indications that anxiety is a large part of the act of auto theft”. Lejeune’s (1977:129) 
study of street muggers likewise reports that “fear is a central concern” pre-crime. 43 
of the 45 participants labelled fear as the “most salient feeling experienced before and 
during” their first mugging. This was true even for those previously socialised into 
violence via street fights and gang fights.  
 
As an illustration, we now provide a number of first-hand quotes across a wide range 
of crime types. The quotes illustrate that the function of fear/anxiety acts both to ensure 
a state of readiness among those contemplating crime and as a compensatory 
mechanism to alert individuals to the potential risks: 
 
“The adrenaline gets to pumping. It might seem like you’re cool but you not. 
It’s always there, the thought of getting caught. It’s always there” (Car Thief 
cited in Copes & Tewksbury, 2011). 
 
“To be perfectly honest I was shitting myself” (Bank Robber, cited in Gill, 
2001:70). 
 
“Yeah, just a little nervous…Then I just hit my mind and cleared it out. You 
know, I take a real deep breath. Now I’m relaxed and before my nerves come 
back up…hey, I’m going’” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:106). 
 
“Fear. Cold blooded fear. It’s really amazing about people who rip off other 
people. You know, here you are the victim and saying: ‘Wow, I’m scared to 
death. They’re gonna cut me and do all these things to me’. And meanwhile you 
don’t realize that the dude that’s doing the ripping off, man, is just as scared, if 
not more afraid of you” (Mugger, in Lejeune 1977:129). 
 
Katz (1988) outlines that the reconnaissance of a target is not a cold calculation of costs 
and benefits but is one salient with subjective feelings impacting upon the decision. 
Offenders who reported refraining because a particular offence was too risky often 
referred to a general ‘feeling’ that the offence was ‘not right’ rather than to any specific 
identifiable cue that they were aware of. In most instances the ‘feeling’ was thought to 
result from intuition rather than some immediately recognisable guardianship, which 
was read by the offender as a warning: 
 
“There are some other signs that unconsciously come to you. It’s basically a 
feeling that you have” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:96). 
 
“It all depends on how you feel about it really. If you feel in the mood for doing 
something, then nothing is going to stop you from doing it. If you get a bit 
shaky, something has shaken you, then you say, ‘Let’s go home and have a drink 
or a smoke or something’” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984). 
 
"If the feeling ain't right, I won't go in there its like some clock inside, which 
says you'd better not go in" (Commercial Burglar in Wiersma, 1996: 221).  
 
The feelings alluded to above have been reported across the crime event. For burglars, 
Cromwell et al. (1991: 318) suggest that fear is less likely in the target selection phase 
because these offenders are not usually ‘at risk’ during this phase and fear, stress and 
other emotions are therefore less aparent. Other studies on burglary however suggest 
that this is not the case because the timing between reconnaissance and crime 
commission is quite small and the risks are high. For example, one burglar noted the 
anxiety associated with approaching the crime target: “That’s when I be making my 
split decisions; should I or should I not? I’m thinking about it for maybe about five 
minutes” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:105-106). The same is also true for 
auto theft (Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014:361; 2016:37-8). Although reconnaissance on 
cars to steal “provides real-time information about risk…[it]…can make one look 
suspicious to patrolling officers…Getting ‘noticed’ by a bystander can increase the 
likelihood of being officially identified; actual confrontation…with owners or 
guardians makes the police more likely to be called upon to intervene; and if 
confrontation evolves into violence, the offender risks being charged with additional 
crime” (Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2016:37-38). In one study, over half the sample of 
armed robbers reported being nervous, scared, and worried about the way to ‘hit’ their 
target. This however, was reduced to 20% during the commission of the crime itself 
(Kapardis, 1988:44). In a separate study of commercial robbers, “virtually every 
offender” reported some level of nervousness whilst committing a robbery (Kroese & 
Staring, 1994). Fraudsters similarly reported an elevated level of fear during the crime 
commission phase. This is particularly the case with cheque forgeries where the need 
to replicate the signature was seen as “the most dangerous time” and the “moment of 
tension [at which] it was most likely that something would go wrong” (Fraudsters cited 
in Finch, 2011).  
 
In sum, fear and related emotions appear to be a standard feature of criminal choices. 
These emotions are observed across the different aspects of the crime event, from 
planning and preparation to crime commission. In some cases, these emotions serve to 
prime an individual to proceed with a criminal act. In others, awareness of these 
emotions is interpreted as evidence that the attendant risks might be sufficiently high 
to decide against further action.  
 
Sources of Fear 
 
If we assume that fear and related emotions are a common component of offender 
decision making, then what are the sources of such emotions? Studies typically 
attributed feelings of fear to a fear of detection. For example, Cherbonneau and Copes’ 
(2006) study of 54 auto thieves demonstrates offenders are well aware that such 
offending is inherently risky. Primarily the risk stems from potential interactions with 
police during both the pre-crime searching phase and in the post-crime getaway in the 
stolen vehicle. The study highlights how interactions (even imagined ones) with police 
in particular triggers apprehensiveness, fear, stress, anxiety, uncertainty and tension. 
Feelings of fear and anxiety are embellished when offenders perceive police to be 
skilled “at discerning and deciphering the physiological manifestations of these 
emotions” (2006:203). As offenders have outlined:  
 
“You look suspicious by looking spooked”. A second offender outlined: “See 
the scared people, that’s the ones who draw attention. They the ones who panic. 
You got to be calm” (Auto Thief, 2006:203/4). 
 
“You don’t want to go in a place thinking things that will upset you. You got to 
be normal, man, walk up to the house like it’s yours. You got to look around. 
[If the] police ride by man, wave at ‘em…You don’t want to do nothing that 
draws suspicion, being nervous is how you get caught” (Burglar cited in Bennett 
& Wright, 1984:106). 
 
Other studies suggested that fear may relate to being challenged by conscientious 
workers or empowered bystanders (see Alarid et al., 2009):   
 
 “I were afraid when I went into the bank, I didn’t think, you know I didn’t think 
I’d do it, and then I just went up to the counter and gave her the note, and I just 
couldn’t believe it was happening ‘cos she was so calm, just giving me the 
money, you know? She didn’t laugh or think ‘oh he ain’t serious’, because if 
she’d just challenged me I would have run. She didn’t, she just read the note, 
straight away she just put the money in the bag” (Bank Robber cited in Gill, 
2001:64). 
 
“I was scared, very nervous, I was shaking. That is why he set the alarm off, he 
could see that” (Bank Robber, cited in Gill, 2001:71). 
 
Several studies of shop theft note the important role of perceptions of informal 
surveillance to embellish a sense of fear. It is argued that the fear of being watched can 
produce as big a deterrent effect as actual surveillance because it exacerbates the natural 
feelings of fear that accompany crime commission.  
 
“If somebody’s watching…I’ll go over and buy my popcorn or whatever and 
leave” (Cardone & Hayes, 1999:46) 
 
“I’d be kind of nervous about [large clothing retail chains]. There’s just 
something about them. I’ve taken a couple shirts from, I think it was [a large 
clothing retailer], and I didn’t get caught. But I don’t go now. I was just really 
uncomfortable about the whole thing” (IBID).  
 
A recent example of the preventive gains resulting from offenders ‘feeling’ as if they 
are being watched is provided by Nettle et al.’s (2012) study of the ‘watching eyes 
effect’. Nettle et al. (2012: 2) write that, ‘the rationale for the [watching eyes] effect is 
that being observed committing an act is likely to lead to social repercussions, either 
positive or negative, and thus it makes sense that when observed, people tailor their acts 
so as to be more socially desirable. The watching eyes in the studies are always just 
images, and thus cannot in fact observe anything. The effect occurs nonetheless, since 
humans have fast, automatic psychological mechanisms which have evolved to respond 
to all eye-like stimuli’. Nettle and colleagues (2012) go on to demonstrate that anti-
cycle theft signage containing a pair of human eyes and the message ‘cycle thieves, we 
are watching you’, produced a 62% reduction in reported cycle thefts at a university 
campus (compared to the rest of the campus) in the one year following intervention. 
 
For some crime types, a very real fear is that co-conspirators are in fact working for the 
police (Jacques, 2010). This also has clear preventive implications surrounding the need 
to create uncertainty in the minds of offenders surrounding who can be trusted.  
 
Finally, Walsh (1986:48) argues that when criminals engage in ‘rational’ planning, it 
imposes a “greater strain” than when relying on impulsivity and hunch. If rational 
planning is utilised, and the offence fails – “the result is to be instantly confronted with 
one’s own inadequacy.” If it fails after spontaneous decisions, the failure “can be 
explained by saying that of this occasion he was not really trying”. The commercial 
burglars studied by Walsh (1986) self-reported rational planning restricted them 
because a natural by-product was “much more fear and anxiety”. 
 
Variance between offenders: the role of experience 
 
The capacity to feel and cope with fear is, like most human emotions, likely to vary by 
individuals, consequent on their genetic endowment and developmental experiences. 
Individual differences are likewise expected among offender populations, with certain 
individuals more sensitive to feelings of fear than others. A dominant theme in the 
offender decision-making literature is the effect of experience on the intensity of and 
approaches for dealing with fear. For example, testimony in Beauregard & Bouchard’s 
(2007) study of sex offending indicates that lack of experience may be associated with 
heightened levels of fear: “The first rape I was nervous and I panicked so I left evidence 
everywhere.” An armed robber largely agrees: “It’s like a buzz. The adrenaline flow is 
unbelievable. You do shit yourself. The first one is the worst. It don’t get any better, 
you just get used to it” (cited in Gill, 2001: 70). In the absence of experience, fear may 
stem from a feeling of the unknown, in particular the attendant risks and potential 
rewards. As one car thief outlines: “I remember that feeling of excitement. Like a big 
ole rush, but at the same time I had that fear of what could happen” (cited in Copes & 
Tewksbury, 2011: 66).  
 
Although these are obviously isolated statements within wider studies, experimental 
research provides supporting evidence. Carroll and Weaver (1986) conducted an 
experiment that compared the verbal recall of experienced and novice shoplifters as 
they walked through a real-life store. Participants were encouraged to ‘think aloud’ 
about the various risks and potential facilitators they observed when contemplating 
shop theft. These verbal utterances were tape-recorded. Experts’ verbal statements 
differed substantially from novices. The latter dedicated 39% of their statements to the 
chances of being observed or being caught. Experts only dedicated 16% of their 
statements to these perceptions. Novices also more regularly expressed negative 
feelings (10%) than experts (2%) (1986).  
 
Clare (2011) largely replicated this finding via structured interviews with 53 expert 
burglars and 53 novice burglars. Novices reported higher levels of fear of apprehension 
during their first and most recent burglaries. Feeney’s (1986:65) study of 113 robbers 
indicates “most of the first-time robbers indicated that they felt fear and apprehension 
as they approached their robberies”. As experience developed however, their fortitude 
for crime was likely to harden, and tentativeness and fear reduced. Experienced 
offenders also “debate less in mental conversations with themselves and in 
communication with others in latter crimes in a series” (Hochstetler, 2002:64). Thus, 
the first crimes in a series are “significant turning points in criminal trajectories” 
(Hochstetler, 2002:64). Indeed, Cherbonneau and Copes (2006) similarly highlight that 
criminal success breeds criminal self-confidence which in turn makes both fear 
management and the ability to read the adversary’s non-verbal behaviour an easier task. 
Kroese and Staring (1994) argue that it is not that experienced offenders do not feel 
nerves, but it is that they have learnt to deal with them substantially better. 
 
Lejeune’s (1977:130) study of mugging demonstrates that the more muggings 
conducted by the offender leads to a normalization of behaviour and minimization of 
fears: 
“You scared the first time. But the second time you feel better. The third time 
you even feel better” (Mugger, in Lejeune 1977:131). 
 
“After the first few times I wasn’t scared any more” (Mugger, in Lejeune 
1977:131). 
 
“I was scared. The first couple of times you felt you would get caught. But then 
you got used to it” (Mugger, in Lejeune 1977:131). 
 
Results of Fear 
 
All behaviour can be thought of as an interaction between the person and the situation. 
From this perspective, crime can likewise be thought of as the result of internal 
dispositions in combination with situational contingencies that may promote or 
constrain certain behaviours. A crucial corollary to the notion of person-situation 
interactions is that different people might construe the same situation differently. In this 
respect, it is interesting to consider what the literature on offender decision making has 
to say about the ways in which fear might affect offender perceptions and subsequent 
behaviours. First, we find consistent evidence suggesting that subjective internal 
feelings impact the decision to offend or not. In other words, fear may give rise to a 
deterrent effect:  
 
“You just walk in there and if there is the chance, you take it. Sometimes you 
are not in the mood so you don’t want to know. Sometimes something is telling 
you not to do it” (cited in Butlet, 1994).  
 
“I just said it wasn’t meant for me to do [a burglary] today…that’s when you 
get caught” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:117). 
 
“I got home and count my blessing…You got to get over that spooked 
feeling…If I had…went on I would’ve been caught because I didn’t pay 
attention to my first mind” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:117). 
 
“I be shaking’ when I’m [doing a burglary] ’cause, you know I have a feelin’ 
that I’ll get caught. But I’m trying’ not to think about that and have faith in what 
I’m doing” (Burglar cited in cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984:128). 
 
Second, they may also increase opportunities for detection. As mentioned previously, 
one interaction noted in Beauregard & Bouchard’s (2007) study of sex offending 
indicates that fear and panic led to offending mistakes: “The first rape I was nervous 
and I panicked so I left evidence everywhere.” The fear of detection may lead to a 
behavioural change which itself increases the chances of detection in the eyes of the 
offender: “[The risk of being apprehended] crosses my mind, but then I just kind of 
block it out. You start thinking about that and you start getting paranoid and start getting 
clumsy and stupid” (Burglar cited in Bennett & Wright, 1984) 
 
However, there is also some evidence to suggest that these psychological states may 
actually benefit offending behaviour in particular circumstances. Jacobs and 
Cherbonneau (2016:36) outline in their study of auto theft:  
 
“Fear energizes conduct to minimize risk and thereby facilitate offending. In 
essence, the offenders used fear as a resource. They drew from it to choose the 
time and place for offending, to prequalify settings for risk, to commit offenses 
rapidly and stealthily, to enlist co-offenders, and to develop contingency plans 
to head off potential trouble. Contrary to prior conceptualization, the ‘present-
orientation’ cultivated by fear appeared to make offenders more attuned to 
sanction threats, not less. This sensitivity encouraged a degree of focus that 




Jacobs and Cherbonneau’s (2017) study of nerve management and crime 
accomplishment is one of the few that positions these concerns at the centre of its 
analysis. They consider nerve management as “an intervening exercise in the threat 
perception process that moderates the fear-offending relationship through its effect on 
nervousness” (Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2017: 618). Management processes 
encompass both cognitive (self-medication, shunting and fatalism) and presentational 
approaches (smoothness and lens widening). Whilst cognitive approaches attempted to 
downplay fear and regulate the “thinking patterns that give rise to nervousness” (Jacobs 
and Cherbonneau, 2017: 8), presentational approaches attempted to convey normalcy 
and “minimize the cues that might otherwise cause offenders to be nervous” of being 
noticed (Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2017: 7). The former deals with inner psychology, 
the latter outward appearance. 
 
The research evidence further suggests that offenders consciously focus on how to 
reduce immediate risks via projecting a self-image of normality. Cherbonneau and 
Copes’ (2006) study of auto theft outlines how providing an “illusion of normalcy” is 
a large focus of the offender throughout the whole crime script. Offenders incorporate 
such measures to “build normalcy into self-presentations so that the brief attention of 
‘fleeting looks’ from authorities do not escalate into ‘studied looks’” (2006:203). These 
‘normalcy illusions’ are a “laborious task” and “fraught with both interactional and 
emotional challenges” according to the researchers (2006:203). This is because 
offenders must not only hide their genuine intentions but also hide the fact they are 
hiding their genuine intentions. This has been found in burglary studies also. Hockey’s 
(2016) burglars repeatedly refer to the need to be “normal” (p2), “look unsuspicious” 
(p3) thus suggesting they expect to be seen by others at some point (p7). Katz (1988:63) 
refers to this as the “second layer of work – the work of appearing not to work at 
practicing normal appearances”. 
 
Alarid et al. (2009:8) demonstrate how many street-robbers attempt to remove or reduce 
fears by actively seeking co-offenders. Thus, co-offenders provide a “reassuring 
presence”, not just in terms of increased physical capital but also psychological 
resources that aid the depersonalization of the victim, increase confidence that the goal 
will be accomplished and ease “tension” and “uncertainty” at critical moments of the 
crime’s commission. Hochstetler’s (2001:749) interviews with robbery and burglary 
groups illustrate that influential group members not only inflate optimistic talk pre-
crime but also decide to omit discussions centred on risk in order to ease the fear of 
others. Group dynamics and influence are perhaps best illustrated in the following 
quote: 
 
“My head was whirling - I gripped the steering wheel and clenched my teeth. I 
tried to see the faces of Red and Fred…I could sense that they too were not so 
nonchalant as they would have liked me to believe…It was the ancient herd-
instinct that buoyed us up’ forced us to continue though we separately did not 
wish to” (Robber cited Bennett & Wright, 1984:159).  
 
Some offenders may also self-medicate to alleviate such fears. This is perhaps 
surprising considering that alcohol and drugs may increase the chances of making 
costly errors. Yet, the finding has been reported across a wide range of crimes. For 
example, 19.2% of burglars reported using alcohol to minimize fears and to “fortify 
themselves” pre-crime (Kang & Lee, 2013:24). Over half of the burglars in the 
Cromwell, Olsen and Avary (1991a: 315; 1991b: 60) studies (n=30) referred to 
consuming alcohol or marijuana in order to “be steady”, “reduce the paranoia” or to 
“keep up my nerve” because of the high level of fear and anxiety pre-break in. Jacobs 
and Cherbonneau’s (2017) participants reported preferences for marijuana and alcohol 
to alleviate fear. One commercial burglar referred to the use of other substances: "It is 
less risky when you take a rophypnol-pill; you're less scared, because when you're 
scared you take more risks" (Wiersma, 1996: 223). Other studies reported drugs such 
as cocaine, speed, heroin and PCP often unintentionally exacerbated the fears the 
offenders were attempting to minimize (Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2017).  “Many” 
confessed that in the absence of drugs or alcohol, the necessary courage would not have 
been apparent to commit the crime (Cronwell et al., 1991:316). Others stated:  
 
“I’m scared to death to go in a house. If I didn’t smoke a joint or have a few 
drinks I couldn’t do it. If you get inside and you’re not ‘cool’, I mean if you’re 
not aware of what’s going on around you, you’re gonna get caught” (1991b:60).  
 
“I’m so scared that I can’t think straight without some ‘junk’ or at least some 
‘weed’. Once I’ve got straight, then I’m OK. I’m not afraid and I can think good 
enough to get the job done and get away safe (1991b:61). 
 
“[I]f I went [to do a burglary] straight, I wouldn’t have the balls to do it” 
(Burglar, cited in 105).  
 
Other offenders are known to return to previous crime sites in the interests of familiarity 
(Hochstetler, 2002), operating within their cognitive ‘awareness space’ (Brantingham 
and Brantingham, 1993). At such sites, it is assumed that offenders will be in possession 
of greater knowledge about the attendant risks and rewards, thereby reducing any 
feelings of anxiety that may arise if scoping out a new unfamiliar area. This pattern of 
offending accounts for the high levels of repeat and near repeat victimization which 
have been documented across several units of analysis (people, products, places, 
properties) and for various crime types (Grove et al., 2012; Pease, 1998; Bowers & 
Johnson, 2004; Townsley et al., 2000). It is referred to as the boost account. Similarly, 
offender preferences to operate in areas they are familiar with, mainly as a result of 
routine everyday activities, is a recurrent explanation for why a) most crime trips are 
relatively short and tend to cluster in and around nodes that offenders are familiar with 
(such as home) (Townsley and Sidebottom, 2010) and b) spatial displacement is the 
exception rather than the norm (Guerette and Bowers, 2009) – offenders are disinclined 




This paper set out to explore what is already known on the role of fear and other 
emotions in the decision-making process of offenders.  The findings from this paper 
help us to draw five broad conclusions. Most importantly from this paper we can say 
that, decision-making was made under emotional pressure. The task of criminal 
decision-making appears to be laden with negatively expressed thoughts and emotions. 
Fear appears to be ubiquitous in offender decision-making. This is true across the stages 
of a crime (pre-planning, execution, getaway). It is also true across a wide range of 
crimes. Fear functions to ensure a state of readiness among those contemplating crime 
and as a compensatory mechanism to alert individuals to the potential risks. 
Interventions that aim to increase such fear during situational decision-making should 
therefore be beneficial. 
 
Second, the sources of fear are multiple. They include objectives features such as fear 
of detection by police/security, fear of detection by conscientious bystanders, fear of 
the unknown, fear of co-conspirators being deceptive and fear of interaction with 
others. Fear of the ‘unknown’ is paramount. This source of fear includes subjective 
features of the environment that the would-be offender cannot formalize but 
subjectively ‘feels’. The fact that decision-making at the scene is undertaken in such an 
emotionally intense state however, means we should not expect offenders to be able to 
clearly identify each of the security features present. Targeted messaging could 
facilitate this and engender an even greater emotional toll. Such feelings can be 
multiplied if the would-be offender believes the ability of security to detect suspicious 
behaviour is high. Interventions that therefore highlight, embellish and evidence the 
ability of security, staff and/or bystanders to detect suspicious behaviour should have a 
positive net benefit. As criminals are assessing a scene for security weaknesses and 
opportunities, they may be just as likely to witness such communications if properly 
displayed. This may help ‘nudge’ the would-be offender into objectively bringing these 
factors into their risk/reward calculation. Emotional pressure is therefore malleable and 
could increase or decrease depending upon the offender’s experience and perceptions 
at the site. The deterrence literature is heavily influenced by the effect that offender risk 
perception has on committing crime (Apel, 2013; Jacobs, 2010; Pogarsky, 2002). This 
field often looks at how transmission of information regarding legal sanctions and 
detection capabilities can discourage individuals from committing offences (Apel, 
2013; Jacobs, 2010; Pogarsky, 2002). 
 
Interventions that also minimize the volume of available information for offenders 
should also therefore increase uncertainty and either lead to full disruption or the 
offenders taking ever greater risks to minimise their uncertainty and in turn, maximising 
the chances of detection. Denying what they need can also mean creating uncertainty 
and unpredictability about security arrangements at a site. For example, unpredictable 
timing, type and location of security patrols makes it difficult to determine a pattern of 
activity that they can exploit with any confidence.  
The denial of information may lead to ambiguity. Prior behaviour and decision-making 
literature have defined ambiguity as instances where vital information related to a task 
is missing (Frisch & Baron, 1988). Decision-makers are often found to avoid situations 
of ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961) and may exclude ambiguous information from their 
decision-making process (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003). More recently, Wakeman 
(2015) demonstrated that when individuals experience ambiguity during their decision-
making process, they attempt to resolve the issue by seeking clarity. Ambiguity may 
affect risky decision-making by imposing fear that the adversary has an advantage over 
oneself (Frisch & Baron). Thus, individuals may be averse to completing a risky 
decision-making task if they perceive that their opponent holds advantageous 
information that will benefit the opponent’s decision-making (Frisch & Baron). In the 
context of this paper, the denial of information may cause ambiguity and therefore, fear, 
in the offender. Increasing ambiguity and signalling the advantageous position of 
security services may deter an offender from completing their risky decision-making, 
thus deter them from completing a criminal act.  
Detection and the promotion of integrated, effective capabilities, such as vigilant and 
engaged security officers with timely and appropriate response, can be particularly 
powerful. This is because criminals operate with a different mind-set to the normal site 
user. First, they have guilty knowledge – they know they are at the site for malicious 
reasons. Second, they know that their need for specific information means they may be 
behaving in a way that is out of the norm making them self-conscious and potentially 
susceptible to detection. As such, criminals have a natural underlying anxiety or 
paranoia (e.g. feelings) about being detected which can alter their perception (e.g. 
thoughts) and behaviour. The resulting anxiety and concern can also produce 
behaviours that make individuals easier to detect. An experimental study of behavioural 
cues in “suspects” versus “non-suspects” indicated that those who had a “suspicious” 
intent behaved significantly different from those who did not (Jian, Matsuka & 
Nickerson, 2006). Indeed, Jian and colleague noted that suspects engaged in behaviours 
(such as moving away from a target before returning back) to hide their deceptive 
intention.  Studies looking at the behavioural cues in risky situations, especially in a 
criminal context, are needed to further understand how suspicious behaviour can be 
detected. There is especially a need for experimental designs to test the effect of 
anxiety, fear, ambiguity, and risk on behavioural patterns. Such studies can inform 
security services, and perhaps guide detection.  
 
Third, fear by itself is insufficient to prevent a crime in some occasions. Whilst fear is 
ubiquitous, some offenders manage to regulate it via a number of routes. These include 
co-offender dynamics, substance abuse and experience. The mechanism through which 
these routes regulate fear differs. Co-offender dynamics distract from the fear and 
provides both reassurance and comparative prototypes to anchor the would-be 
offender’s sense of risk against. Communications that highlight the impact of 
confidential informants and human sources may therefore increase uncertainty within 
such co-offender groups. Substance abuse dampens fear and thereby aids cognitive 
management of the situation. Site managers should therefore not easily dismiss strange 
behaviour as solely being down to substance abuse. There may be an intervening 
variable (criminal activity) that created both the need for substance abuse and the 
expression of strange behaviour. Experience regulates fear and allows for 
presentational management of the situation. Interventions may therefore seek to keep 
the offender guessing by regularly shifting security practice to create a fear of the 
unknown.  
 
Fourth, the fact that fear is ubiquitous may improve the likelihood of detection. Fear 
may lead to suspicious behaviours, consciously “acting normally” which itself may 
appear suspicious, and lead to poor decision-making. What suspicious and deceptive 
behaviours objectively looks like requires a great deal of further research. Studies in 
this field would benefit from using a range of research methods, in order to expand on 
the knowledge of suspicious behaviour. As discussed above, experimental studies test 
the theoretical aspects discussed here (and elsewhere). Based on the findings in this 
review, it is vital that studies test the effect of fear depending on crime type and 
situation. In-depth interviews with offenders, where detailed description of a criminal 
act is given, has the potential to provide a fuller description of suspicious and deceptive 
behaviour. Further, experimental studies can be applied to test how different security 
intervention may have an effect on fear, and other emotions, which may cause changes 
in behaviour. Drawing upon the literature discussed in this review, it would be 
especially appropriate to test the effect of security interventions on fear over time. 
Experienced offenders learn to manage their fear, therefore the use of a range of 
different security interventions may hinder successful fear management.  
 
Finally, fear does lead to deterrence in some offenders on some occasions. Of course, 
deterrence lies at the heart of many efforts to prevent violent and antisocial behaviour. 
Deterrence is identified as a dominant mechanism through which various policies, 
programmes, and practices implemented in the name of crime prevention are assumed 
to work. Deterrence is also generally understood through the lens of rational choice, the 
model of offender decision-making adopted herein. Rational choice is invoked in 
discussions of deterrence in two main ways: general deterrence at a macro level via the 
apparatus of the criminal justice system and the imposition of formal sanctions, and 
specific deterrence at the micro level through the management and manipulation of the 
immediate environment in ways that influence the decision-making of prospective 
offenders (Wortley and Sidebottom, 2017). This paper is concerned exclusively with 
deterrence as it applies to the micro-level, namely the policies, programmes, and 
practices implemented in the interests of preventing crime. It should also be 
remembered the studies cited above all focus upon individuals that have actualised their 
crimes. The numbers of individuals deterred by fear alone are unquantifiable simply 
because they are not captured in such analyses originally. We need to better understand 
though, the conditions in which preventive measures are more or less likely to give rise 
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